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Drug Prices Under the Medicare 
Drug Discount Card Program
Emin M. Dinlersoz, Rubén Hernández-Murillo, Han Li, and Roger Sherman
In early 2004, the U.S. government initiated the Medicare Drug Discount Card Program (MDDCP),
which allowed card subscribers to obtain discounts on prescription drugs. Pharmacy-level prices
were posted on the program website weekly with the hope of promoting competition among card
sponsors by facilitating consumer access to prices. A large panel of pharmacy-level price data
collected from this website indicates that price dispersion across cards persisted throughout the
program. Prices declined initially when consumers were choosing cards, but rose later when sub-
scribers were restricted to commit to their card choices. In contrast, contemporaneous prices from
online drug retailers, which were unrelated to the program, rose steadily over time, indicating that
program prices evolved in a way different from the general evolution of prices outside the program.
(JEL D43, D83, I11, I18, L11, L13, L50)
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in scale in the history of government policy on
information transparency.
The MDDCP and its successor program,
Medicare Part D, were intended to induce com-
petition among drug card sponsors, largely
through the extensive amount of price information
that drug card sponsors were required to release
on the website. The premise was that the ease of
consumer search for prices in the program web  -
site would enable them to choose the lowest-price
card sponsor, leading to intensified competition
among sponsors. However, at the same time that
the MDDCP generated price information with the
intent to boost competition among drug cards,
the program design also required subscribers to
commit to a single drug card once they subscribed,
rather than being allowed to switch cards at will.
This institutional constraint on consumer switch-
ing, among other factors, could inhibit competi-
O
n April 29, 2004, in conjunction
with the Medicare Drug Discount
Card Program and Transitional
Assistance Program (MDDCP), the
U.S. government activated a website to publicize
prices offered by discount cards for more than
800 prescription drugs at individual pharmacy
levels across all zip code areas in the United
States. The MDDCP was initiated as a transition
to the broader Medicare Part D prescription drug
assistance program that took effect in January
2006, aiming to lower the cost of drugs and
therapy for elderly and handicapped individuals
covered by Medicare. The price information on
the MDDCP website was updated on a weekly
basis for the duration of the program. This
mandatory release of prices continues under the
Medicare Part D program, and it is unmatched
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of St. Louis.tion by preventing consumers from switching to
low-price providers. Thus, a major question is
whether MDDCP competition among the drug
card sponsors was indeed effective in lowering
drug prices as intended by the program initiators.
This paper studies the dynamics of prices
over the course of the program by using a large
sample of prices collected from the MDDCP web-
site for several weeks. The empirical analysis
indicates that the program resulted in economi-
cally significant and persistent price dispersion
across cards. More importantly, the evidence
points to a nonmonotonic time path for prices.
Drug prices declined in the early phases of the
program when card subscription was still diffus-
ing across consumers, and they rose later when
new card subscriptions slowed and consumers
could no longer switch cards, although the mag-
nitudes of these shifting trends were not excep-
tionally large relative to the overall average of
program prices. As a benchmark for comparison,
contemporaneous prices unrelated to the program
were collected from online drug retailers, and
these prices exhibited a steady upward trend. In
particular, when MDDCP prices declined, online
prices rose, and when both sets of prices rose, the
rise in MDDCP prices was actually greater than
the rise in online prices. Thus, MDDCP prices
evolved differently from the general evolution of
drug prices outside the MDDCP, indicating that
the time path of prices within the MDDCP cannot
be explained simply by general trends in regular
online drug prices.
The analysis of the evolution of prices under
the MDDCP is relevant because of the potentially
large welfare consequences of government poli-
cies aimed at increasing competition, which con-
tinue under Medicare Part D. At the time of the
study, the population eligible for drug cards was
around 7.5 million, and it has continued to grow
since Medicare Part D took effect in 2006. The
design of a viable prescription drug program for
the elderly is still a major policy issue and the
success of the ongoing Medicare Part D remains
to be seen. Therefore, lessons learned from the
MDDCP experience are valuable in assessing the
success of government-sponsored competition
and information dissemination about prices. By
increasing program awareness, making the price
information publicly available through its web-
site, and helping eligible consumers choose
cards, the program’s goal was to increase compe-
tition among rival prescription drug suppliers
and to help establish a market in which such
increased competition persisted in the long run
even after the broader Medicare Part D took
effect. The belief, at least in part, was that effective
consumer search for lower prices would discipline
the pricing behavior of suppliers and lead to lower
prices. Certain theories of consumer search (e.g.,
Stahl, 1989) suggest that easier consumer search
can exert downward pressure on prices in a mar-
ket. Related empirical work (notably, Brown and
Goolsbee, 2002) also demonstrated that the dif-
fusion of consumer search can be associated with
lower prices, provided consumers were uninhib-
ited in switching to lower-priced suppliers. Yet,
the results here suggest that no systematic and
economically significant decline in prices occurred
when the overall price dynamics within the pro-
gram are considered.
Official surveys and studies on the marketing
performance of the MDDCP point to several rea-
sons that appear to have prohibited effective
search by consumers, which could have allowed
the reallocation of consumers to lower-priced
cards.1 Efforts to inform potential beneficiaries
about drug cards and the enrollment process were
limited, particularly about the cost of cards and
the extent of the discounts available. In addition,
the program’s website and the existing help lines
were not particularly useful in guiding consumers
to choose the card that was best for them. Thus,
these studies do not suggest any strong indication
that consumers were able to make highly informed
and close to ideal choices. Consumers also were
often confused about the abundance of cards and
pharmacies from which to choose, which made
it difficult to make the best choice. Furthermore,
the low inherent propensity of Internet usage and
searching capability among elderly individuals
prevented effective usage of the website for con-
sumer decisionmaking. All these impediments
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1 See, for instance, the 2005 U.S. Government Accountability Office
study GAO-06-13R.seem to have led to price dynamics in the program
that did not coincide with the program’s intended
effects.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
The next section provides background for the
MDDCP. The third section presents some theo-
retical guidance, followed by a description of the
data. Empirical analysis and results are then
described before our concluding section.
THE MDDCP BACKGROUND
The design and the institutional environment
of the MDDCP are crucial for understanding the
functioning of the retail drug markets created by
the program. The MDDCP allowed qualified drug
card sponsors to make arrangements with drug
manufacturers to obtain discounts and pass these
discounts on to Medicare recipients. Eligible con-
sumers could subscribe on a strictly voluntary
basis to a card of their choice and obtain their
prescriptions at a discount specified by the card
sponsor. Prescriptions were available either from
retail pharmacies or by mail from mail-order
pharmacies that had arrangements with the card
sponsor. An individual consumer subscribed to
a card by paying a fixed annual fee (for at most
two years), ranging between $0 and $30, and there-
after was entitled to receive that card’s discounts.
The consumer’s problem consisted of two stages:
first, choosing a drug card that provided the best
discount on the bundle of drugs used by the con-
sumer and second, choosing a retail (or mail-order)
pharmacy that sold the drugs of interest.
Certain institutional aspects of the program
were relevant for the dynamics of program prices.
First, a card sponsor was not required to commit
to a given level of discount on drugs over time.
This flexibility in card prices left the door open
for price fluctuations that could result from com-
petition among cards, above and beyond general
fluctuations in drug prices such as those related
to changes in manufacturers’ costs or changes in
demand after the introduction of a generic. For a
given card, there was also no prior commitment
for prices to be the same across all pharmacies
that offered discounts under the card.
Second, in addition to the usual consumer
search and switching costs that contribute to price
dispersion in drug retail markets (see Scott-
Morton, 1997, and Sorensen, 2000, 2001), pro-
hibitive consumer switching costs were inherent
in the very design of the program.2 Once enrolled
in a card program, a consumer was not allowed
to switch to another card, except in certain special
cases, such as moving to a new location or a card
sponsor exiting the market. This restriction on
switching introduced additional friction and
inertia into the market, which may have impeded
reallocation of consumers to low-price card spon-
sors over time. The MDDCP had a nationally coor-
dinated switching period between November 15
and December 31, 2004, during which consumers
were allowed to review their card choices and
change them if they wished to do so. After this
period, a consumer who was already enrolled in
a card was not allowed to switch to another card
until the end of the program, subject to the excep-
tions mentioned. The prevention of switching
after the switching period and the timing of the
switching period could potentially lead to price
dynamics driven by the card sponsors’ incentives
to charge lower prices in the early stages of the
program to attract subscribers, and then to increase
their prices once consumers were locked in to
their card choices.
Third, the diffusion of card enrollment among
eligible consumers was expected to be gradual,
not instantaneous. Consumers had to evaluate
card choices before making a decision. One of
the main criticisms of the MDDCP was the com-
plexity of the card choice process related to the
abundance of alternative plans whose benefits
were hard to assess. This criticism applies equally
to Medicare Part D. Available evidence indicated
that the diffusion of card enrollment was indeed
gradual. According to enrollment data from the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
about 6.4 million beneficiaries were enrolled in
the drug card program as of September 2005,
Dinlersoz, Hernández-Murillo, Li, Sherman
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2 Usual switching costs in the context of prescription drugs include
consumer learning costs about the side effects of a new drug that
can substitute for the consumer’s existing drug and physicians’
inertia in changing prescriptions because of rewards and loyalty
programs offered by the manufacturer or the wholesaler of that drug.toward the end of the program.3 Roughly two-
thirds of participants enrolled early in the program
(May through July 2004). Enrollment was much
faster between May and October 2004 and reached
about 6 million participants (about 80 percent of
the total Medicare population) around October
2004. It rose little thereafter, essentially staying
level after January 2005, when the switching
period ended.
Moreover, most consumers eligible for cards
were 65 years or older, not a group of particularly
Internet-savvy consumers. Shortly before the
program took effect, Fox (2004) estimated that 22
percent of adults aged 65 and older had access to
the Internet. Of this group, an estimated 66 percent
used the Internet to locate health information,
implying that only about 14 percent of the relevant
population used the Internet for health informa-
tion searches. Thus, the overall propensity to use
the Internet as a price search tool was not impres-
sively high in the eligible population.
Further evidence of consumers’ enrollment
and experience with the program comes from an
October 2005 report on the progress of the MDDCP
program prepared by Abt Associates, Inc., on
request from the CMS.4 Based on an extensive
survey of card enrollees and non-enrollees, the
report found that widespread awareness of the
MDDCP was obtained within a few months of
the program. Although a majority of respondents
reported that they had more than enough infor-
mation to make a choice among the cards, one
quarter to half did not consider more than just
one drug card. Some consumers simply took the
first card available, whereas others were enrolled
automatically. About 13 percent of survey partici-
pants obtained information from the Medicare
website, either directly or with the help of a
family member, friend, or counselor who accessed
the website for them. Overall, the available evi-
dence indicates that both the rate of learning about
cards and the search rate for lower prices were
rather low.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Consumer search is an important source of
price dispersion in retail drug markets (e.g.,
Sorensen, 2000, 2001). Static models of search
are abundant in the literature (see, e.g., Salop and
Stiglitz, 1977, Reinganum, 1979, Burdett and
Judd, 1983, and Stahl, 1989). For instance, Stahl
(1989) shows that as the proportion of consumers
who are fully informed of prices increases, aver-
age price falls monotonically. Price dispersion
exhibits nonmonotonic behavior, initially increas-
ing for low values of the informed proportion,
but decreasing for higher values. Although com-
parative statics from this static model can be used,
as in Brown and Goolsbee (2002), to draw some
conclusions for a dynamic framework, the
MDDCP’s institutional environment introduces
further considerations for firms’ and consumers’
behavior over time, which call for a dynamic
framework.
Given the available evidence on intensity of
search discussed in the previous section, it is hard
to argue that consumer search worked as effec-
tively as in ordinary, nonprogram retail prescrip-
tion drug markets. Factors in the previous section
suggest that there may have been little consumer
search in the market created by MDDCP, and the
abundance of choices and the complexities of
the program design may have inhibited search.
Another major constraint of the program is that
it prevented consumers from using more than one
card or from changing their card choices after they
subscribed, with few exceptions. The prohibitive
switching cost could have induced card sponsors
to lower their prices in the early stages of the pro-
gram to attract consumers who had not yet chosen
a card. But as more and more consumers were
locked in to their choices, card sponsors would
have incentives to raise prices. After the switching
period, prices may be expected to rise as sponsors
take advantage of consumers’ inability to change
cards.
This nonmonotonic time path of prices indeed
arises in certain models of dynamic price com-
petition with consumer switching costs, such as
those of Klemperer (1987) and Farrell and Shapiro
(1988). The MDDCP had a lifetime of less than
3 For more details of the enrollment patterns, see the 2005 U.S.
Government Accountability Office study GAO-06-13R.
4 See Hassol et al. (2005).
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dimensions beyond just price. These main features
of the program are captured nicely by the model
of Klemperer (1987), which presents a two-period
differentiated-products duopoly in which con-
sumers are partially locked in by switching costs
that they face in the second period. Switching
costs make demand more inelastic in the second
period. Prices are lower in the first period as firms
compete to build a customer base that is valuable
later. However, prices may be higher in both
periods than they would be in a market without
switching costs.
Two main considerations under the MDDCP
may make the price dynamics differ from those in
Klemperer (1987). First, Klemperer (1987) assumes
perfect consumer information about prices,
whereas the evidence discussed above suggests
that many card enrollees under the MDDCP chose
their drugs with imperfect information about the
cards’ benefits and prices. Lack of perfect informa-
tion about prices would not change the competi-
tion in the second period, because the constraints
on switching would prevent consumers from
abandoning their firms even if they were informed
of a lower price at some point. However, the inten-
sity of competition in the first period could change.
Firms could take advantage of consumers’ imper-
fect information and not lower their prices as
much as they would in the case of perfect infor-
mation. Obviously, a related issue is that each card
sponsor itself probably did not have good infor-
mation on the general pattern of card enrollment
and on imperfections in consumers’ information
about cards. If card sponsors believed, at least ini-
tially until firm evidence on enrollment patterns
emerged, that consumers would make informed
decisions, they would have incentives to lower
their prices.
Second, the MDDCP’s allowance for a round
of card switching in the middle of the program
created incentives for a potential price war by card
sponsors. One implication is that, in addition to
lower prices at the early phases of the program,
lower prices would be expected during the switch-
ing period compared with nonswitching periods.
There is no artificially introduced “switching
period” in Klemperer (1987).
Other considerations, however, could prevent
this predicted nonmonotonic path for prices.
Given the continuing nature of the prescription
drug program with Part D, card sponsors who
use bait-and-switch strategies could harm their
reputations. Although the MDDCP itself lasted
only two years, many card sponsors continued
to participate in Medicare Part D when it started
in January 2006, so sponsors faced the possibility
of alienating consumers because of bait-and-
switch price strategies. One of the program’s goals,
as stated in the Medicare program–related web-
site, was to prevent bait-and-switch behavior.
However, the program did not spell out any strict
guidelines as to what exactly constitutes bait-and-
switch and how it would be prevented.
The discussion so far suggests that the level of
program prices may not have declined steadily
over time. In view of the institutional environ-
ment of the program and the predictions arising
from models of dynamic competition with switch-
ing costs, it is possible to observe a nonmonotonic
path for prices. Given the underlying complexi-
ties of the program design and the fact that con-
sumer search was not exceptionally high in this
market, the pattern the program prices followed
is ultimately an empirical issue.
DATA
In this section we describe the drugs for
which data were collected, the geographic areas
covered, the timing of data collection, and the
other prices obtained for control purposes.
Drugs
Prices were collected for 28 prescription drugs,
which were chosen based on the following three
criteria. First, all the drugs were in the top 100
drugs in claims filed by the elderly in 2001, and
in the top 200 highest-selling drugs for the elderly
in 2003. This selection of relatively popular drugs
ensures that each drug had sufficiently large
demand. The relatively high demand for these
drugs implies that the price dynamics we are seek-
ing are likely to have been apparent and economi-
cally important. Second, half of the drugs are
Dinlersoz, Hernández-Murillo, Li, Sherman
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 short-term drugs, such as antibiotics and pain -
killers, and the other half are long-term, mainte-
nance drugs, such as those used for diabetes and
cardiovascular diseases. The evolution of short-
term drug prices is expected to differ from that
of maintenance drugs, for which consumers are
likely to search more intensely for a bargain.
Finally, drug dosages were selected to reflect the
most frequently prescribed dosages for the drugs,
so that the demand is large relative to what it
would be with unusually high or low dosages.5
Each drug price pertains to a 30-day supply. The
drugs and some of their attributes are presented
in Table 1.
Geographic Areas
The price data from the MDDCP website
were listed at the level of zip codes. Ninety zip
codes were chosen by a random stratified sam-
pling, designed to oversample zip codes with a
Dinlersoz, Hernández-Murillo, Li, Sherman
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5 Drug-specific information was obtained from Mosby’s Drug Consult
(2004, 2005), which features information on the typical usage and
dosages of drugs.
Table 2
Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis
Variable Description
LONG_TERM Dummy variable, 1 if the drug is a maintenance drug, 0 if the drug is primarily for short-
term use 
GENERIC Dummy variable, 1 if the drug has a generic equivalent or is itself generic, 0 if the drug is 
brand name 
PRES_2003 The total number of prescriptions for a drug in 2003 
PAT_EXPIRE Dummy variable, 1 if the drug’s patent had expired by 2004, 0 otherwise
PAT_EXCLUSIVE Dummy variable, 1 if the drug has an exclusive patent for a specific condition, 0 otherwise 
FDA_YEAR The year a drug was approved by the FDA 
WALGREENS Dummy variable, 1 if the pharmacy is a Walgreens store, 0 otherwise 
CVS Dummy variable, 1 if the pharmacy is a CVS store, 0 otherwise 
ECKERD Dummy variable, 1 if the pharmacy is an Eckerd store, 0 otherwise 
GEO Dummy variable, 1 if the card offers national coverage, 0 otherwise 
FEE The fixed one-time enrollment fee to a given card in dollars 
MFG The number of manufacturers with which a card has a contract for discount prices 
ASSIST Dummy variable, 1 if the card offers enrollment assistance, 0 otherwise 
MAIL Dummy variable, 1 if the card has a mail-order option for drugs, 0 otherwise 
FORMULARY Dummy variable, 1 if the drug offers the entire formulary of Medicare-approved drugs, 
0 otherwise
FRAC65+ Fraction of people ≥65 years or older in a zip code 
MEDHINC Median household income in a zip code
RENT Median rent for renter-occupied housing units in a zipcode
FRACWHITE65+ Fraction of people ≥ 65 years  in a zip code who are white
FRACFEM65+ Fraction of people ≥ 65 years in a zip code who are female
POP65+ Population in a zip code ≥ 65 years
POPWHITE65+ Population in a zip code ≥ 65 years and white
POPFEM65+ Population in a zip code ≥ 65 years and female
SOURCE: FDA, U.S. Food and Drug Administration.greater proportion of the population composed
of elderly residents, defined as individuals who
are 65 years of age or older. To determine any
demand side effects on prices, we needed to
ensure a sufficient variation in market size and
other demand shifters, such as income, for dis-
count drugs. The population of residents 65 or
older in a zip code is a proxy for the local market
size for MDDCP cards. The proportion of elderly
people in a zip code population varies in our
sample from a low of 3 percent to a high of 92.6
percent; the average is 28 percent and the standard
deviation is 25 percent. We also gathered zip
code–level demographic data from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s 2000 Zip Code Statistics to analyze the
price effect of demand shifters such as income
and race composition (Table 2).
The program’s price search engine listed
prices for all pharmacies within a circle of a cer-
tain radius whose center coincides with the center
of the selected zip code area. The search engine
allowed for a choice of four different radii for any
given zip code, and these radii varied by zip code.
For densely populated urban areas, radii tended
to be much smaller, whereas for less densely pop-
ulated suburban and rural areas, the radii were
larger, so that cardholders in these areas could
obtain price information for a sufficient number
of pharmacies. We collected price data for all
pharmacies within the smallest and the second-
smallest radii around a given zip code. This selec-
tion enabled us to assess the sensitivity of our
results to the choice of radius.
Timing of Data Collection
The price data were updated weekly on the
Medicare website between April 29, 2004, and
December 31, 2005. As shown in Figure 1, the
sample in this paper was collected for several
weeks to cover important periods when the
MDDCP was in effect.6 Prices were first made
available online on April 29, 2004, card enroll-
ment began on May 3, 2004, and cards went into
effect on June 1, 2004. Data collection was initiated
on June 21, 2004, three weeks after subscribers
were first allowed to use their cards under the
program.7
The first wave of data was collected each week
for a period of seven weeks during the summer
of 2004. We refer to this period as the preswitch-
ing period. The second wave was collected during
the last week of December 2004. This week is
within the period between November 15 and
December 31, which was the nationally coordi-
nated switching period. Price observations from
this period enable us to test whether card spon-
sors lowered their prices in an effort to induce
switches. Finally, the third wave was collected
after the end of the switching period to assess the
behavior of prices when switching cards was not
allowed. We label this period the postswitching
period. During the postswitching period, the col-
lection process took place over nine collection
cycles, which included data from March 7, 2005,
through August 15, 2005.
Each price observation pertains to a drug
sold by a pharmacy at a given location under the
discount offered by a given card at one point in
time. The prices are posted prices, not necessarily
transaction prices. Transactions may have taken
place at only a subset of the posted prices, and
some cards may have had little or no sales for
some drugs. Therefore, posted prices do not nec-
essarily coincide with the set of prices at which
transactions take place. Lacking sales data, we
are unable to make any statements on these issues.
No card sponsor imposed explicit restrictions on
the geographic or time variation in prices.8 Geo  -
graphic variation may have occurred for several
reasons, including the changing demand and cost
conditions or simply the changing composition
of cards across locations.
7 The price data during the initial weeks of the program contained
certain glitches, as noted by others (see Antos and Pinell, 2004).
Some prices reported by pharmacies were found to be inaccurate
and incorrect. However, these problems were fixed to a large extent
within the first few weeks of the program. To ensure reliable data,
we started collection in the fourth week after the cards went into
effect.
8 A brochure offered by a Walgreens store in Houston, Texas,
specifically stated that prices were subject to change from store to
store and over time.
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6 The data collection process was automated using iOpus Internet
Macros software that allowed periodic recording of the data from
the Medicare website.Dinlersoz, Hernández-Murillo, Li, Sherman




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Part of our analysis aims to assess the magni-
tude of savings offered through card usage by con-
trolling for changes in the general level of drug
prices unrelated to the MDDCP. Ideal control data
for this purpose would be comparable pharmacy-
level, nonprogram retail price data collected at a
weekly frequency to match the sample of MDDCP
prices. Unfortunately, such detailed data are dif-
ficult to find. Instead, we collected nationwide
wholesale prices for the drugs in our sample. The
prices listed here are from Mosby’s Drug Consult
(2004, 2005), which provides prices for major drug
wholesalers by dosage and duration. They are a
representative sample of the wholesale prices
typically used to reimburse patients for their pre-
scriptions.9 Unlike the card prices, however, these
prices are not available by geographic units.
Rather, a single nationwide price is reported by
each supplier, usually a manufacturer. In addition,
the price quotes are not available at a weekly fre-
quency. Instead, they are representative of the
price levels for the year the database was formed.
Despite their shortcomings, these prices are the
best readily available benchmarks and can be used
to approximate savings. As we will show, the
MDDCP prices exhibit little or no geographic dis-
persion. Thus, the nationwide prices in Mosby’s
Drug Consult can serve as a reasonable benchmark.
To attribute the evolution of prices to program
specifics, the general trends exhibited by drug
prices over the course of the program also need
to be eliminated. For this purpose, we collected
concurrent weekly prices posted by Internet drug
retailers for the same drugs and dosages as in the
program data. We used a major Internet prescrip-
tion drug search engine, which quoted prices
from several Internet drug retailers.10
Unlike program prices, online prices exhibit
no geographic variation. Because they are subject
to general nationwide trends in drug prices, they
can serve as a good comparison group for the
prices posted by card sponsors. The purpose of
this comparison is twofold: First, it allows us to
assess whether consumers would be able to obtain
lower prices simply by purchasing at regular
online prices available to general consumers,
rather than going through the complicated process
of choosing a card and hunting for lower prices.
Second, and more importantly, online prices can
be used to control for general changes in drug
prices unrelated to the program. Drug prices can
change over time because of changes in manufac-
turers’ costs, availability of new substitute drugs,
general inflation, or other factors. All such general
trends are expected to apply in similar ways to
MDDCP prices and online prices. Therefore, if
different time patterns are observed for program
prices versus other online prices, it is likely that
program effects are an important cause. However,
online prices may not reflect the exact set of non-
program prices available to Medicare-eligible
consumers. These consumers typically do not
buy at regular online prices. Thus, online prices
should not be viewed as an exact control group
for Medicare-eligible consumers, but rather as a
benchmark to control for general trends.
ANALYSIS
We begin with an analysis of the variation in
price levels, followed by estimates of the extent
of savings possible through the MDDCP. We then
focus on price dynamics using the second-smallest
radius for each zip code. The results were very
similar when the smallest radius was used instead.
Analysis of Price Variation
The starting point of our analysis is under-
standing whether significant price dispersion
Dinlersoz, Hernández-Murillo, Li, Sherman
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9 The nature of these prices is described in Mosby’s reference book
as follows: “Prices are AWP (average wholesale price), a benchmark
price used for reimbursement. AWP represents what a retail phar-
macist or a dispensing physician might pay for a product, without
any special discounts. There are, however, many discounts already
in place, so the AWP can often approximate the price that a con-
sumer might pay. The prices listed here are not intended to serve as
an up-to-date substitute for supplier price lists. The price listings
give the reader a good idea of the range between the high and low
prices.”
10 Once again, the data were collected by using iOpus Internet Macros
from the website destinationrx.com. Our sample includes eight
online retailers. Online stores of two major discount retailers
(costco.com and walmart.com), online stores of two large drug
retail chains (cvs.com and homemed.com), and the pharmacy
branch of one major health care service provider (aarpharmacy.com).existed in the market for drug discount cards and,
if so, what drove that dispersion. Figure 2 illus-
trates the dispersion of prices for one drug, Lipitor,
for the week of June 28–July 3, 2004. The upper-
left panel is the histogram of the entire set of
Lipitor prices observed across cards, zip codes,
and pharmacies. The upper-right panel is the
distribution of the average price within a given
card. The average price for a card is calculated
using all price observations pertaining to the card.
The average price varies between about $65 and
$74. However, as shown in the two lower panels,
the dispersion of price within a card is usually
very small, amounting to an economically negli-
gible variation across pharmacies within a card,
even though such lack of variation was not explic-
itly guaranteed a priori by any card.
To determine whether the pattern in Figure 2
is typical of all drugs, we consider a general
expression for the price pdrczt of drug d offered
by card c at pharmacy r in zip code z at time t: 
(1)       
where ﾵ is a constant, fi is a fixed effect for i ￿
{d,r,c,z,t}, and edrczt is a zero mean error term
that accounts for remaining unobserved factors.
The contribution of each of the main factors to
the overall variation in price can be analyzed by
using analysis of variance (ANOVA) to understand
the components of variation in prices. Because
pharmacies are “nested” within zip codes, a
nested ANOVA was performed to decompose the
total variation in prices for each drug. Results of
the ANOVA for the first week of data (June 21-27,
p f f f f f e drczt d r c z t drczt =++++++ µ ,
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Lipitor Price Dispersion: Week of June 28 to July 3, 20042004) showed that the variation in price of any
drug across cards is the major component of the
total variation in drug prices. On average, about
87 percent (standard deviation [SD] 15.3 percent)
of the total variation in price is explained by the
variation across cards, and there is little variation
within cards. The variation across zip codes was
only 0.5 percent (SD 2.1 percent) of the total vari-
ation on average, and the variation across phar-
macies accounted, on average, for only 1.3 percent
(SD 1.8 percent) of the total variation. The hypoth-
esis that the average price of a drug is equal across
cards is rejected strongly for all drugs. We repeated
the ANOVA for other weeks and the findings
supported the same conclusions.11
The finding of little variation in retail prices
across zip codes raises the issue of how much
geography affects pharmacies’ pricing behavior.
By the effect of geography, we mean the location-
specific factors that may affect prices, such as
income level of residents, population, and age
composition in a location, which are particularly
relevant as demand shifters. The ability to control
for all other factors is important in investigating
geographic variation in prices. The ideal experi-
ment would look at the geographic variation in
prices for a given drug and card combination,
holding constant the pharmacy composition
across zip codes. Such an experiment is impossi-
ble, however, because pharmacy composition
changes across zip codes. Nevertheless, a close
approximation to this ideal experiment is possi-
ble by looking at the prices charged by the stores
of a given pharmacy chain across zip codes. The
individual stores of a chain, such as Walgreens
or CVS, tend to have very similar structures and
practices, so a good approximation can be
obtained by assuming that the store-level features
are roughly constant across zip codes for a given
chain. We calculated the coefficient of variation
of prices across all stores of a pharmacy chain
for each drug and card combination. In almost
all cases, the coefficient of variation was either
exactly zero or very close to zero. Thus, price
variation across zip codes arose mainly because
the composition of cards and pharmacies changed
across zip codes.
Although the analysis of variance in prices
clearly indicates that much of the cross-sectional
variation was attributable to the variation across
cards, it does not provide information about spe-
cific factors responsible for this variation. Identify  -
ing key demand and supply factors that affect
prices is important for understanding why prices
differed across drugs, cards, pharmacies, or zip
codes.
Consider the following version of equation
(1) that includes explanatory variables explicitly
for a given a time period (week):
(2)  
where ʲi is a Ki ￗ 1 vector of coefficients and Xi is
a Ki ￗ N matrix of observables, for i = d,r,c,z. Each
Xi has the form
where xj is an N ￗ 1 vector that contains vari-
ables specific to cluster j = 1,…,Ki within group 
i = d,r,c,z.
The structure of the error term in equation (2)
is assumed to be 
(3)             
where edrcz is the error term in equation (1) and
is assumed to be uncorrelated across observations.
The error terms ʵi (i ￿ {r,d,c,z}) represent the
remaining unobserved part of the fixed effect fi
in (1) after the observable Xi is added to the speci-
fication in equation (1) to obtain equation (2).
Specification (3) implies that error terms are cor-
related within drugs, cards, pharmacies, and zip
codes because of the presence of cluster-specific
errors ʵi (i ￿ {r,d,c,z}). Because the component ʵi
is fixed within cluster i, we can include dummy
variables for drugs, cards, pharmacies, and zip
codes to account for these unobserved compo-
nents. The error term defined in equation (3)
then reduces to edrcz as in equation (1), which is
assumed to be uncorrelated across observations
within a cluster, and we can implement the regres-
p X X X X drcz d d r r c c z z drcz =+ + + + + µβ β β β ε ,
x x xKi 1 2…    
′,
εε ε ε ε drcz d r c z drcz e =++++ ,
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11 We also performed the ANOVA for mail-order prices for cards
with a mail-order option. Not surprisingly, the entire variation in
the case of mail-order prices (excluding shipping charges) was
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Independent variables I II
LONG_TERM –51.10 (0.04) –51.10 (0.04)
GENERIC –11.58 (0.07)  –11.58 (0.07)
PRES_2003 –0.0000027 (0.0000001) –0.0000027 (0.0000001)
PAT_EXPIRE 48.09 (0.06) 48.09 (0.06)
PAT_EXCLUSIVE 192.93 (0.09) 192.93 (0.09)
FDA_YEAR 1.89 (0.02) 1.89 (0.02)
WALMART 0.14 (0.05) 0.16 (0.06)
CVS –0.94 (0.06) –0.94 (0.06)
ECKERD 0.69 (0.03) 0.68 (0.04)
GEO 4.94 (0.61) 5.14 (0.61)
FEE 0.07 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01)
MFG –0.44 (0.06) –0.47 (0.06)
ASSIST –4.15 (0.7) –4.17 (0.7)
MAIL 2.04 (0.48) 2.13 (0.48)
FORMULARY 1.82 (0.15) 1.73 (0.17)
FRAC65+ –0.33 (0.09) —
MEDHINC –0.00037 (0.000013) –0.00022 (0.000097)
RENT 0.0064 (0.00037) 0.0066 (0.00039)
FRACWHITE65+ –0.29 (0.03) —
FRACFEM65+ –0.24 (0.02) —
POP65+ —– 0.03 (0.002)
POPWHITE65+ — 0.029 (0.0017)
POPFEM65+ — 0.0024 (0.0003)
Card dummies YY
Drug dummies YY




NOTE: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses.sion in equation (2) without using any cluster
effects.12
The results of the regression are shown in
Table 3 for two specifications for the week of
June 21-27, 2004. We used the same specification
for other time periods and the results were robust.
In evaluating the results, it should be noted that
the drugs in our sample form only a subset of all
drugs (28 of more than 800 drugs) covered by the
MDDCP. Therefore, some characteristics that
would apply in general to the drugs in the entire
list of the MDDCP may not be fully represented
in this relatively small sample.
The explanatory variables, including the
dummies, account for 98 percent of the variation
in prices. Given the large number of observations,
almost all coefficients are precisely estimated.
Long-term maintenance drugs in our sample were,
on average, cheaper than the short-term drugs,
based on the prices for 30-day supplies.13 Generic
drugs and brand-name drugs for which generic
alternatives are available were cheaper compared
with drugs that do not have generic alternatives.
The prices were also lower for drugs that are pre-
scribed more frequently. In addition, newer drugs
had higher prices, as indicated by the positive
coefficient on the year of approval by the FDA.
The coefficients on selected pharmacy chains
suggest that Wal-Mart had slightly higher prices,
by about 14 cents, than those of the omitted cate-
gory of all remaining pharmacies, while CVS
prices were lower by about a dollar than those
of the omitted category. Eckerd, which merged
with CVS in the spring of 2004 shortly before the
MDDCP took effect, had prices that were higher
by about 70 cents than those of the omitted 
category.
Cards with national coverage and with a mail-
order service tended to have higher prices than
cards that did not have national coverage and
mail-order service. Cards with higher subscrip-
tion fees and with a broader formulary also tended
to have higher prices. Cards that had arrangements
to provide discounts with a larger number of drug
manufacturers and those that provided enroll-
ment assistance had lower prices than the cards
that did not offer these benefits. Certain quality
dimensions, such as formulary breadth, extensive
geographic coverage, and cost-reducing features
such as association with a larger number of man-
ufacturers, apparently were important for the
differences in price across card sponsors.
Demographic characteristics of zip code areas
also influenced prices to some extent. Zip codes
with a higher proportion of elderly people in the
population had lower prices. Zip codes with a
higher median household income also had lower
prices, whereas zip codes with higher housing
costs were associated with higher drug prices;
but these effects are relatively small.
Estimates of Savings
The finding of differences in prices across
cards noted in the previous section raises the
following question: Were the differences large
enough to reward searching for lower prices
across cards? Several small-scale studies tried to
assess the extent of the discounts in the early
phases of the program with only a handful of
drugs and a few zip codes.14 Such investigations
generally found some savings accruing to card-
holders, but the small scale of these investigations
prevented any general conclusions. In the follow-
ing text, we ignore the card enrollment fee, which
in most cases was zero and could not exceed $30,
and look only at the savings a cardholder could
obtain from using the card to purchase drugs at
card prices versus purchasing at regular retail or
online prices.
12 Because of the large number of dummy variables in this regression
(>1,000 pharmacy dummies), we use the “de-meaned” regression
approach (Greene, 1993, pp. 468-69). By de-meaning the observa-
tions by pharmacy, we eliminate the pharmacy dummies and still
obtain the usual ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of the coef-
ficients of interest.
13 The price difference should not be taken as evidence that the cost
of therapy is lower for long-term drugs in general, because long-
term prescriptions typically are renewed for several months and
some short-term prescriptions are prescribed for periods shorter
than a month (antibiotics such as Zithromax, which are used for
intense treatment for a week in certain cases). If the drug is used
only seven days, the cost of therapy will be low.
Dinlersoz, Hernández-Murillo, Li, Sherman
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14 See, for example, Antos and Ximena (2004). Their approach first
identifies a few health conditions that are common among the
elderly and then calculates the total price of a bundle of drugs
typically prescribed to remedy these conditions.Let p –
dct be the average price of drug d for card
c in week t, where the average is taken across all
pharmacies selling drug d offered by card c. Define
p –
dt and pdt
min as the average and the minimum of
p –
dct across cards in week t. Similarly, define the
average and minimum regular prices obtained




Mosby,min, where the average and the minimum
are calculated across the wholesalers listed in the
Mosby’s database for a given drug. In addition to
the prices in Mosby’s database, a separate, inde-
pendent source is the set of prices we collected
from online pharmacies as described earlier.
Define the average and minimum prices for online




We now define several alternative measures
of potential savings. The first measure is the sav-
ings a naive (or nonsearching, or uninformed)
consumer could obtain. A naive consumer is
defined as one who purchases randomly with
equal probabilities across cards. For a single pur-
chase of the drug at a given point in time, if this
consumer uses a card instead of buying at the
regular wholesale price (i.e., outside the discount
program), the savings are the percentage difference
between the average regular price and the average
card price. We report the average of these savings
across all weeks in the data in percentage form
as follows:
(4)            
The second measure is the savings that
accrued to an Internet searcher, who uses the
program website to search for the lowest-price
card for a given drug, but otherwise would pur-
chase randomly in the regular market (outside
the program) because of higher search costs (as
opposed to searching for discounted prices online).
The savings of such a consumer are defined as the
percentage difference between the average price
in the regular market and the minimum price in
the discount card market averaged across weeks,
and are obtained simply by replacing p –
dt in equa-
tion (4) by pdt
min.
The third measure we consider is the savings
























sumer is defined as one who is fully informed of
prices in both markets and thus is always able to
purchase at the minimum price. The average sav-
ings across weeks for such a consumer are formally
defined as the percentage difference between the
minimum price in the regular market and the
minimum price in the discount card market aver-
aged across weeks, and are obtained by replacing
p –
d
Mosby in equation (4) by pd
Mosby,min and p –
dt by pdt
min.
Following Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2003),
we also define the “value of information” in the
drug discount card market, which is the saving
of a consumer informed of all card prices with
respect to that of a naive consumer,
(5)               
We also report the value of information for online
prices and prices from Mosby’s database.
The defined savings measures and the values
of information are reported by drug in Table 4. A
naive consumer could obtain an average savings
of 11.2 percent. The average savings were even
higher for a searcher—about 25 percent. An expert
consumer, on the other hand, had little to gain
from purchasing in the discount card market: An
average savings of only 2.3 percent accrued to such
a consumer. Because most drug card users were
likely non-experts in searching, the estimate of
savings to naive consumers, or at best to searchers,
is likely to be the most reasonable estimate.
A somewhat different picture emerges when
we consider the savings with respect to online
prices. A searcher could obtain an average savings
of 8.7 percent by purchasing at the minimum card
price instead of purchasing randomly from one
of the online pharmacies. However, the benefit
for a naive consumer was negative (but statisti-
cally insignificant), and an expert consumer could
obtain positive (again statistically insignificant)
savings. Thus, compared with online prices, card
prices did not appear to provide substantial sav-
ings. The average value of information also was the
highest for regular prices, indicating the biggest
rewards to searching, with an average savings for
an informed consumer that amounted to around
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.followed closely by card prices. The value of infor-
mation in the online market was the lowest.
Dynamics of Prices
We now turn to the evolution of prices. Price
changes using two balanced panels of pharmacies
from the preswitching period and the postswitch-
ing period are examined in the first subsection
below. Next, we investigate the behavior of prices
around the switching period. The evolution of
online prices is examined for comparison with
program prices, followed by consideration of the
evolution of price dispersion within the program.
Results from the Balanced Panels
Using a slight modification of equation (1), a
price observation can be written as
(6) 
where we introduced the interaction terms, fct, a
card- and time-specific effect, and fdt, a drug- and
time-specific effect. The term fct captures poten-
tially different behavior of cards over time. Differ  -
ent cards may have had different pricing policies
that may have depended on time as competition
among card sponsors changed. In addition, the
time and drug interaction effect, fdt, captures the
possibility of different drugs experiencing differ-
ent price changes over time (e.g., cards may have
competed more intensely in certain popular drug
categories). The fixed effect, ft, can be interpreted
as the general time effect on prices, which is a
combination of the program’s effect on price and
general fluctuations in drug prices outside the
program.
The specification in equation (6) can be esti-
mated using our unbalanced panel of observations.
This approach has two drawbacks. First, a very
large number of effects (both pure and interaction
effects) must be estimated. Second, and more
importantly, the included effects are not guaran-
teed to exhaust the set of relevant effects, which
may lead to omitted variable bias, and the time-
invariant fixed effects can potentially be correlated
with the error term. One approach to alleviate
these concerns is to use time differencing, which
eliminates the time-invariant fixed effects. By
p f f f f f f f drczt t ct dt d c r z drczt =++ + +++++ µη ,
taking the difference of the prices for two consec-
utive time periods, t and t′, we obtain
(7)              
where dct, ddt, and dt are the obvious time differ-
ences for the corresponding fixed effects and 
ʵdrczt = ￿ʵdrczt – ʵdrczt￿. Because differencing works
only if we have the same pharmacies across the
two time periods, we restrict attention to a bal-
anced panel.
Now, consider the following ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression based on equation (6): 
(8)       
where Dct, Ddt, and Dt are dummies for the differ-
enced effects dct, ddt, and dt. The error term ʵdrczt
has serial correlation, which we take into account
in estimating the standard errors.
One problem with this approach is that the
balanced panel has a low cross-sectional dimen-
sion if we restrict attention only to observations
common across all weeks of data in the sample
period. Because of errors in accessing the MDDCP
website that occurred randomly during the data
collection, there was some attrition in our sample
and the balanced panel that can be constructed
across all weeks of observation is limited in size.
However, because this attrition was entirely ran-
dom, a systematic bias is not a concern. Conse  -
quently, we implement regression (8) separately
for the seven weeks in the preswitching period
and then for the nine weeks in the postswitching
period. This approach provides a large, but differ-
ent, number of cross-sectional observations for
both periods. We handle the data for the switching
period separately as discussed below.
We first consider the evolution of prices using
a panel from weeks 4 to 10 of the program, the
preswitching period. The results of the difference
regression for this period are shown on the left side
of Table 5. The estimates of ʲt are all negative and
statistically significant, except for week 5 of the
program. Most of the drop in prices in this period
took place between the fifth and eighth weeks,
resulting in a decline in general level of prices of
about $4.77. By the end of the 10th week, the
prices were lower by about $4.63. However, this
∆p D D D drczt ct ct dt dt t t drczt =++ + βββ ε ,
∆p d d d drczt ct dt t drczt =++ + ε ,
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of the average ($81.90) of all price observations
during the fourth week of the program when data
collection began.
We repeated the analysis for the postswitching
period using a balanced panel. The evolution of
the prices in the sample of weeks from the post  -
switching period shows a different pattern com-
pared with the preswitching period, as seen on
the right side of Table 5. In fact, the estimated ʲt
coefficients are all positive and statistically sig-
nificant. Between the starting and ending weeks
of the sample in the postswitching period, prices
rose by about $8, controlling for drug and card
effects. Much of this increase took place between
the end of the switching period and the end of
June 2005. Thereafter, prices stabilized somewhat.
Between the end of the switching period and the
end of June, prices rose at a pace of about $2 a
month. The total rise in prices represents about
9.5 percent of the average drug price in the fourth
week of the program.
Figure 3 displays the discrepancy in the aver-
age evolution of prices for different cards and
drugs. Specifically, the upper two histograms
display the frequency distributions of the time
average of the card-time effects plus the pure-
time effects, 
(9)                      
for the preswitching and postswitching periods,
on the left and the right panels, respectively.
Analogously, the bottom two panels contain the
frequency distributions of the time average, of
the drug-time plus the pure-time effects, 
(10)                    
for the preswitching period on the left and the
postswitching period on the right. As is evident
from the histograms on the left-hand side of the
upper and lower panels, most cards and drugs had
lower prices during the preswitching period.
However, the right tails of these histograms show
a few outlier cards and drugs that exhibited an
average upward trend in prices even during this
period. In contrast, for the postswitching period,
all cards and drugs exhibited an average upward
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Table 5
Estimated Coefficients of Time Dummies from the Difference Regressions
Dependent variable: first difference in price 
Independent variables:  Estimates for  Independent variables:  Estimates for 
dummy for the week of preswitching period dummy for the week of postswitching period
6/28/2004 0.21 (0.27) 4/4/2005 2.85 (0.11)
7/5/2004 –2.25 (0.38) 5/16/2005 4.53 (0.16)
7/11/2004 –3.73 (0.47) 6/6/2005 6.54 (0.20)
7/18/2004 –4.77 (0.54) 6/20/2005 7.74 (0.23)
7/25/2004 –4.64 (0.61) 7/11/2005 7.74 (0.26)
8/2/2004 –4.63 (0.66) 7/18/2005 7.7 (0.28)
8/1/2005 7.8 (0.31)
8/15/2005 7.83 (0.33)
N 92,700 N 18,280
R2 0.53 R2 0.51
NOTE: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Omitted time dummy is the first week for each regression: 6/21/2004 for
the preswitching period and 3/7/2005 for the postswitching period.trend in price (seen in the histograms on the
right-hand side of the upper and lower panels).
Overall, these histograms suggest that prices of
cards and drugs on average moved in the same
direction within the preswitching and postswitch-
ing periods with few exceptions.
We repeated the estimation in equation (8)
by adding a long-term drug dummy interaction
with a time dummy to explore whether long-term
drugs exhibited any different behavior compared
with short-term drugs. We found that during the
preswitching period, the prices for long-term
drugs actually fell less, and during the postswitch-
ing period they rose less compared with short-
term drugs. This pattern does not support the
hypothesis that consumers searched more vigor-
ously for bargains on these drugs. If this were the
case, we would have expected to see a steeper
decline for these prices compared with the prices
of short-term drugs.15
The Switching Period
For the nationally coordinated card-switching
period between November 15 and December 31,
2004, we were able to collect only one week of
price data because of technical problems in
accessing the website during much of that period.
As a result, we were able to collect data for only
15 drugs, and the generally smaller number of
observations for that period precluded us from
including the switching period in the balanced
Dinlersoz, Hernández-Murillo, Li, Sherman
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15 One possible explanation is that consumers with an existing pre-
scription for a given long-term drug who have purchased from
their preferred pharmacy for a long time may not have found it
worthwhile to search vigorously for a card and a possibly different
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Frequency Distribution of Average Card–Time and Drug–Time Effects
NOTE: *As defined in equation (9). **As defined in equation (10).panel analysis of the previous section. Instead,
we compared the average price level for each drug
using two paired t tests. For each drug, we per-
form two paired t tests across common cards and
pharmacies: one for the difference between the
week from the switching period and the last week
of the preswitching period, and the other for the
difference between the first week of the post -
switching period and the week from the switch-
ing period. The paired t test approach eliminates
the fixed effects that are common across the two
periods and isolates the time effects, just like the
balanced panel used previously.
As shown in Table 6, both tests indicated a
statistically significant decline in prices for most
drugs (12 of 15) between the last week of the pre -
switching period and the week of the switching
period, and a subsequent statistically significant
rise for most drugs (11 of 15) between the week
of the switching period and the first week of the
postswitching period. The magnitude of price
drops and raises varied across drugs. Overall,
prices declined on average by about $1.80 between
the week of August 2, 2004, and the week of
December 20, 2004, and rose on average by about
$1.50 between the week of December 20, 2004,
and March 7, 2005.
Given the nature of the timing of data collec-
tion, we cannot say precisely whether the decline
in prices between the week of August 2, 2004, and
the week of December 20, 2004, was confined to
the switching period only. Because card enroll-
Dinlersoz, Hernández-Murillo, Li, Sherman
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Table 6
Analysis of Price Changes Around the Switching Period
(Switching period price) –  (Postswitching period price) – 
(Preswitching period price) (Switching period price)
Average  Average 
Drug difference ($) Paired t statistic p Value difference ($) Paired t statistic p Value
Ambien –1.99 –6.91 0.00 0.31 5.42 0.00
Amoxicillin –2.28 –26.56 0.00 1.33 11.38 0.00
Atenolol –0.77 –9.62 0.00 0.18 0.67 0.49
Augmentin –3.07 –2.46 0.01 0.72 2.88 0.00
Biaxin –2.65 –10.55 0.00 2.80 22.66 0.00
Carisoprodol –0.63 –1.29 0.04 1.50 3.29 0.00
Cefzil –2.93 –17.94 0.00 –0.10 –0.89 0.37
Cipro –4.81 –5.00 0.00 3.69 3.35 0.00
Detrol –2.09 –4.18 0.00 3.27 12.47 0.00
Doxycycline hyclate 0.58 8.73 0.00 0.21 4.25 0.00
Flexeril –0.70 –3.18 0.00 2.61 16.08 0.00
Glucotrol XL 0.34 7.92 0.00 1.03 14.00 0.00
Isosorbide mononitrate  –3.36 –14.22 0.00 2.30 1.31 0.18
Lanoxin 1.32 22.87 0.00 0.05 0.60 0.54
Levaquin –3.80 –10.78 0.00 2.48 12.42 0.00
Average –1.79 1.49
Standard error  0.45 0.33
NOTE: “Switching period price” is the price during the one week of data available from the switching period. “Preswitching period price”
is the price during the last week (week of 8/2/2004) of price observations in our preswitching period sample. “Postswitching period
price” is the price during the first week (week of 4/4/2005) of price observations in our postswitching period sample. Bold t statistics
indicate significance at 5 percent or lower levels.ment continued during this period, card sponsors
could have continued to reduce their prices to
some extent to attract additional consumers, as
they did in the initial phases of the program.
Some card sponsors, in anticipation of the switch-
ing period, may have also lowered prices in an
effort to deter consumers from switching. Thus,
some of the observed price decline in this period
could have occurred even before the switching
period. We are more comfortable attributing the
rise in prices after the switching period to the
existence of switching costs, because during that
period card enrollment diffused to a large extent
and enrolled consumers were committed until
the end of the program.
In summary, the evidence from the balanced
panel estimation and the paired t tests points to
initially declining but later rising prices, even
though the magnitudes of change in price levels
were not exceptionally large compared with the
average price level across drugs. The pattern
exhibited by prices lends more support to a model
in which prices move in a nonmonotonic path,
falling when consumers could switch cards and
rising when they could not switch cards.
Evolution of Nonprogram Online Prices
We now consider the evolution of online drug
prices as a benchmark for the evolution of program
prices. If the time effects found in the evolution
of program prices are specific to the program
rather than being driven entirely by general trends
in drug prices, the same time effects should not
emerge for online prices unrelated to the program.
To explore this possibility we consider a regres-
sion of the form
(11)       
where Dt is a time dummy, Di is a dummy for
online retailer i, and Dd is a dummy for drug d.
The focus is once again on the estimates of the
coefficients of time dummies.
Few problems were encountered in data col-
lection of online prices over time, so our sample
includes a larger number of weeks and the price
changes can be observed with a higher frequency
over a longer period, sometimes even more fre-
p D D D dit t t i i d d dit =+ + + + αβ β β ε,
quently than once a week. Table 7 presents the
results of the estimation in equation (11). The time
dummies have almost uniformly positive and
significant coefficients, and the coefficients are
almost monotonically increasing over time. By
the last week of data, prices were higher by about
$3.39, controlling for vendor and drug fixed effects.
We repeated the estimation in equation (11)
using the total price (base price plus shipping
fee) as the dependent variable and the results
were very similar. The total price increased over
time by about $3.53 and the estimated coeffi-
cients were uniformly positive and statistically
significant in almost all cases.
Finally, we also used a balanced panel
approach as in equation (8) to estimate the time
effects for online prices. The size of this panel
was much smaller than that of the unbalanced
panel used in equation (11), because we did not
have prices for all sellers and for all drugs every
week. The average growth rate of price between
the first and the last periods of observation was
3.31 percent (SD 0.11 percent). Only four drugs
exhibited a decline in price. Overall, the results
from the balanced panel were similar qualita-
tively to the estimates of time dummy coeffi-
cients in Table 7.
The observed pattern for online drug prices
thus indicates that the evolution of program
prices was indeed different from the evolution of
prices outside the program. Online prices
tended to rise over time, in contrast to the pro-
gram prices, which first declined and later
increased. Because online prices are subject to
general trends in drug prices, but not to the
effects of the program, the patterns suggest that
the evolution of program prices is at least in
part driven by program effects, rather than
entirely by general trends. First, online prices
rose during the preswitching period when the
program prices exhibited a clear decline. The
decline in program prices is consistent with the
predictions of dynamic price competition mod-
els, suggesting an escalated competition in the
early stages of a market when sellers lower their
prices to lure consumers. Second, the overall
rise in online prices fell short of the rise in pro-
gram prices during the postswitching period.
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about $4 more than online prices by the end of
this period. Therefore, the upward trend in pro-
gram prices after the switching period cannot be
explained simply by a general rise in drug prices
caused by nonprogram effects.
In addition to the evolution of levels of prices,
we also investigated the evolution of price dis-
persion. To measure price dispersion at any point
in time, we first calculated the average of a drug’s
price within a card. Next, we computed the dis-
persion of that average around its mean across
cards. We then used the balanced panel of obser-
vations to test the hypothesis that the price dis-
persion remained the same over time versus the
alternative that dispersion changed. We found no
overwhelming evidence that the dispersion of
average price across cards changed substantially
during the preswitching or the postswitching
periods. The dispersion of prices was persistent
over the course of the program.
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Table 7
Estimated Time Dummies for Online Price Regression 
Independent  Dependent  Independent  Dependent 
variables variable variables variable 
Dummy for the date: Base price Total price  Dummy for the date: Base price Total price 
Preswitching period Postswitching period
6/28/2004 0.00 (0.58) 0.00 (0.58) 1/13/2005 1.95 (0.63) 1.99 (0.63)
7/8/2004 0.00 (0.58) 0.00 (0.58) 5/6/2005 2.62 (0.62) 2.66 (0.62)
7/15/2004 0.00 (0.58) 0.00 (0.58) 5/27/2005 2.81 (0.62) 2.85 (0.62)
7/26/2004 1.73 (0.60) 1.74 (0.60) 6/10/2005 2.81 (0.62) 2.85 (0.62)
8/3/2004 1.73 (0.60) 1.74 (0.60) 6/20/2005 2.81 (0.62) 2.85 (0.62)
8/10/2004 1.73 (0.60) 1.74 (0.60) 7/11/2005 3.25 (0.62) 3.31 (0.62)
8/17/2004 1.73 (0.60) 1.74 (0.60) 7/29/2005 3.25 (0.62) 3.31 (0.62)
8/24/2004 1.73 (0.60) 1.74 (0.60) 8/1/2005 3.30 (0.62) 3.36 (0.62)
9/1/2004 1.81 (0.61) 1.87 (0.61) 8/18/2005 3.33 (0.66) 3.38 (0.66)
9/13/2004 1.82 (0.62) 1.87 (0.62) 9/16/2005 3.39 (0.66) 3.53 (0.66)
9/15/2004 1.83 (0.61) 1.85 (0.61) 9/29/2005 3.39 (0.66) 3.53 (0.66)
9/21/2004 1.86 (0.60) 1.91 (0.61) 10/4/2005 3.39 (0.66) 3.53 (0.66)
9/24/2004 1.86 (0.60) 1.91 (0.61) 10/16/2005 3.39 (0.66) 3.53 (0.66)
9/28/2004 1.86 (0.60) 1.91 (0.61) 10/17/2005 3.39 (0.66) 3.53 (0.66)
10/5/2004 1.81 (0.63) 1.85 (0.63) 10/20/2005 3.39 (0.66) 3.53 (0.66)
10/15/2004 1.88 (0.63) 1.89 (0.64)
10/20/2004 1.55 (0.64) 1.56 (0.64)
Switching period
12/10/2004 1.93 (0.62) 1.97 (0.62) 
12/29/2004 1.89 (0.62) 1.93 (0.62) 
N 2,955 
R2 0.98 
NOTE: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Total price includes shipping fee for standard delivery for each vendor.
Dates refer to the day the price data were collected. Preswitching period: before 12/2004; switching period: 12/2004; postswitching
period: after 12/2004.CONCLUSION
We used a large panel of drug prices to assess
the effects of government-sponsored release of
price information over the Internet under the
MDDCP. The designers of the program began with
the premise that access to price information by
consumers would lower prices over time. In con-
trast, the card prices and their dispersion did not
steadily decline over time, as some models of
improved access to price information suggest.
Instead, prices declined during the initial phases
of the program but then increased later when
consumers were unable to switch cards. The
evolution of program prices exhibited significant
deviation from the general evolution of prices
outside the program.
The nonmonotonic evolution of program
prices can be reconciled with the predictions of
certain models of dynamic price competition
with consumer switching costs, such as that of
Klemperer (1987). The very design of the program
left consumers vulnerable to price changes by
card sponsors. Card sponsors appeared to have
reduced their prices initially, possibly in an effort
to lure customers to subscribe, but then raised
their prices in the later stages of the program to
take advantage of consumers when they were
locked in to their choices. However, we are unable
to provide any direct evidence on the actual sub-
scription patterns by card or whether consumers
switched cards at all.
The extent to which these patterns will carry
over to Medicare’s Part D prescription drug
assistance program currently in effect remains
to be seen. Although Part D has a much more
complicated structure, some drivers of price
dynamics under MDDCP also apply to Part D. For
instance, consumers can switch plans only from
November 15 through December 31 of every year,
except in special cases. There are also certain
differences between the two programs. Consumer
non-enrollment in Part D carries a financial penalty
that becomes gradually more severe, unlike in
the case of the MDDCP, where enrollment was
voluntary. Also, the prescription drug benefit
providers engage in a multiperiod, long-horizon
competition under Part D, instead of the two-
period interaction under the MDDCP. This broader
time horizon introduces considerations of market
growth. Thus, prescription drug benefit providers
will set prices for a broader horizon, probably
considering the trade-off between charging lower
prices to attract newcomers and higher prices to
already committed consumers. The differences
between the two programs notwithstanding, the
evidence from the MDDCP does not straightfor-
wardly suggest a secular decline in the level and
the dispersion of prices under Part D.
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